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Cognitive Reflection, Decision
Biases, and Response Times
Carlos Alós-Ferrer *, Michele Garagnani and Sabine Hügelschäfer
Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
Wepresent novel evidence on response times and personality traits in standard questions
from the decision-making literature where responses are relatively slow (medians around
half a minute or above). To this end, we measured response times in a number of
incentivized, framed items (decisions from description) including the Cognitive Reflection
Test, two additional questions following the same logic, and a number of classic questions
used to study decision biases in probability judgments (base-rate neglect, the conjunction
fallacy, and the ratio bias). All questions create a conflict between an intuitive process
and more deliberative thinking. For each item, we then created a non-conflict version by
either making the intuitive impulse correct (resulting in an alignment question), shutting it
down (creating a neutral question), or making it dominant (creating a heuristic question).
For CRT questions, the differences in response times are as predicted by dual-process
theories, with alignment and heuristic variants leading to faster responses and neutral
questions to slower responses than the original, conflict questions. For decision biases
(where responses are slower), evidence is mixed. To explore the possible influence of
personality factors on both choices and response times, we used standard personality
scales including the Rational-Experiential Inventory and the Big Five, and used them as
controls in regression analysis.
Keywords: cognitive reflection, decision biases, response times, decision making, Bayesian updating, multiple
processes
1. INTRODUCTION
Human beings attempt to behave rationally, but they often struggle as intuitive impulses get in the
way. Sometimes the latter are useful, sometimes they invite disaster. Modern economic thinking is
shaping the view that decisions are often the result of the interaction between fast intuitive thinking
and the attempt (often unsuccessful) to behave in a rational way. While neoclassic economics
concentrated on rationalistic behavior, other branches as, e.g., the literature on learning in games
(following Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993) focused on the study of behavioral rules of thumb.
More recently, dual-process models from psychology (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Strack and
Deutsch, 2004; Evans, 2008; Alós-Ferrer and Strack, 2014) have received increasing attention in
economics. Thesemodels postulate decision-process heterogeneity at the intra-individual level, that
is, the interaction of more intuitive andmore deliberative processes within a decisionmaker’s mind.
Individual heterogeneity, however, remains an important topic. Across individuals,
heterogeneity concerns whether each particular decision maker relies more or less on one or
the other kind of process. To measure this dimension, a number of scales and questionnaires have
been developed. Among them are the Rational-Experiential Inventory of Epstein et al. (1996),
including its two subscales Faith in Intuition (FI) andNeed for Cognition (NFC), and the three-item
Alós-Ferrer et al. Cognitive Reflection and Decision Biases
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) of Frederick (2005), recently
expanded by Toplak et al. (2014) and Primi et al. (2015). A
recent branch of the literature has investigated interindividual
differences regarding faulty probability judgments (heuristics and
biases) using these scales. Oechssler et al. (2009) and Hoppe
and Kusterer (2011) find that higher test scores in the CRT
are correlated with lower incidences of certain biases, e.g., the
conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). As argued by
Toplak et al. (2011), low CRT scores might indicate a tendency
to act on impulse and give an intuitive response. Alós-Ferrer
and Hügelschäfer (2012, 2016) showed that higher scores in
Faith in Intuition are associated with higher error rates aligned
with certain heuristics, e.g., based on representativeness or
reinforcement, but found no systematic relation between the CRT
and FI.
This work continues the exploration of individual differences
in faulty probability judgments and extends previous works by
considering process data. The dual-process literature naturally
relies on process data for the analysis of multi-process decisions,
an approach which allows inferences which would be impossible
with choice data only. The simplest kind of process data
arises from response times. However, the heuristics-and-biases
literature typically relies on decisions made on the basis of
verbal descriptions, that is, on relatively complex, non-repeatable
questions related to a more or less artificial situation (as for
instance, the LINDA problem from Tversky and Kahneman,
1983). The use of response times in such a setting faces two main
difficulties.
The first difficulty is that within-subject comparisons for a
single question are not possible. However, precisely those are the
standard for response-times studies. In many behavioral studies,
decisions are made in paradigms which allow for repetition,
sometimes even for a large number of trials for each individual
participant. In these cases, one can compare the response
times of different responses for the same individual, which
allows predictions linked to the very nature of processes. For
instance, if (in an extreme case) it is assumed that a certain
response overwhelmingly follows from a certain intuitive process,
while another response overwhelmingly follows from a more
deliberative one, one would predict the first response to be on
average faster, simply because intuitive processes are faster. In
a typical description-based decision, however, a paragraph-long
decision situation is presented, the participant makes a decision,
and moves on to a different question. Hence there is a unique
observation per participant, which is either correct or not. It is
not possible to test hypotheses on the relative speed of different
responses, because such comparisons would be confounded with
personal characteristics. For instance, if a process-based model
predicted errors to be faster than correct responses in a given
situation, and even if this prediction were correct, one might
obtain the opposite result if participants giving correct responses
had higher cognitive abilities, and the latter were associated with
faster response times for the given situation.
For instance, Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014) study a
paradigm where a reinforcement-based heuristic can conflict or
be aligned with more rational decision making (optimization
based on Bayesian updating of beliefs). The main predictions
of the study (following the Dual-Process Diffusion Model,
Alós-Ferrer, 2016) concern the relative speed of errors and
correct responses for a given individual, i.e., a within-participant
comparison. Those are testable because the paradigm allows for
repetition, with 60 different decisions per participant, and hence
one typically has multiple errors and multiple correct responses
for a participant. In a paradigm with one decision per participant
(say, measuring the CRT), errors and correct decisions can simply
not be compared within participants.
The second difficulty is that, when measuring biases
in probability judgments through standard decisions from
description, response times are relatively long. In contrast, the
dual-process literature focuses on rather short response times
(a few seconds at most). Long response times (say, around half
a minute) will always include some deliberation, and hence
any response-time differences accruing from intrinsic differences
among the decision processes involved are likely to be washed
away (see, e.g., Myrseth and Wollbrant, 2016). However, this
does not mean that long response times are useless. It is a well-
established fact that decisions where the decision maker faces
stronger tradeoffs, or is “closer to indifference,” are harder and
result in longer response times (Dashiell, 1937; Mosteller and
Nogee, 1951). This fact can be extended to longer response
times, capturing the intuition that if one alternative is clearly
preferred, a fast decision ensues, but if two alternatives are
similarly desirable, an inner struggle results in a slower decision.
Following this logic, longer response times should be considered
evidence of longer deliberation due to opposed tendencies.
In view of these difficulties, our study focused on within-
subject comparisons across different questions. To this purpose,
we created a number of alternative versions of well-established
questions. The logic is as follows. Many of the questions
used to study biases in probability judgment pit the correct
response against an intuitive alternative favored by a heuristic.
For instance, in the LINDA question, an incorrect response is
intuitively attractive because it is stereotype-consistent. The same
is true for the items in the CRT, where an intuitive response
conflicts with the correct one. To examine process data associated
with the conflict, we created non-conflict versions of those
questions. Depending on the content of the question, however,
one ends with qualitatively different non-conflict items. In some
cases it is possible to turn around the question in such a way
that the intuitive process will remain active and favor the correct
response. We refer to the resulting items as alignment questions,
because both processes remain active but are aligned in terms
of prescribed choices. In other cases, however, it is not possible
to force the intuitive process to favor the correct response. The
conflict can still be removed by shutting down the intuitive
process (removing the cue on which it acts), creating a neutral
version of the original question. In one extreme case, however,
this manipulation was not possible, but it was still possible to
create a non-conflict version where the heuristic points to the
correct answer, but where the exact process (type of computation)
underlying the deliberative process in the conflict version does
not apply. The resulting altered item is called a heuristic question.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic study on
response times for this type of questions. Hence, the analysis in
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this article is novel but exploratory. We collected choice data in a
laboratory environment where participants answered a series of
standard questions regarding probability judgments, the original
CRT of Frederick (2005), and additional items from the extended
CRT of Toplak et al. (2014). Crucially, we measured response
times for those decisions. Additionally, we included a number of
questionnaires measuring personality differences, including the
short version of the Rational-Experiential Inventory of Epstein
et al. (1996) (comprising FI and NFC) and the Big Five (McCrae
and Costa, 1985).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the
experimental design and describes the sample, the methods,
and the natural hypotheses regarding response times. Section
3 presents some preliminary, descriptive results of correlational
nature. Section 4 presents results for the (extended) CRT
questions, including evidence on response times. Section 5
presents the results for behavioral biases, including the relation
to the CRT and evidence on response times. Section 6 concludes.
2. METHODS
2.1. Experimental Design
We investigated decision processes by measuring both choices
and response times for a series of incentivized context-embedded
scenarios (“decisions from description”). We focused on two
types of problems. First, we employed items from the Cognitive
Reflection Test introduced by Frederick (2005) and further
extended by Toplak et al. (2014). Second, we used a sample
of questions tackling typical decision biases in the domain
of belief updating and probabilistic judgment, capturing the
conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983), base-rate
neglect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Fiedler, 2000; Erev
et al., 2008), and the ratio bias (Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992;
Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994).
For both types of problems, questions are assumed to create
a situation of conflict between an “intuitive” answer favored
by a certain heuristic process and the (normatively) correct
response. We complemented each question with a non-conflict
version, hence creating several pairs of items.We developed three
categories of non-conflict versions. For some of the questions,
we created alignment versions where the intuitive answer and
the normatively correct answer coincide. For others we created
neutral versions where the heuristic does not apply, so that there
is no intuitive first answer. Further, for one of the CRT questions
we created a heuristic version where the heuristic points to the
correct answer, but where the computation process leading to the
correct answer in the conflict version does not apply.
Presenting two versions of the same question within one
experiment might potentially direct the participants’ attention
to the deceitful property of these questions. To reduce this
problem while keeping the rationale of the questions intact,
the surface similarity between two paired items was reduced by
using different contextual and numerical contents (see, e.g., De
Neys et al., 2013). For the comparison of response times to be
meaningful, we matched the length of the items for each pair
(all items were translated to German as we relied on a sample of
German-speaking participants). That is, we adapted the wording
of the questions to guarantee that the number of sentences was
always the same for each pair. Further, the number of words,
characters, and syllables of the German translations did not differ
by more than 10% across the questions of a given pair. To
this aim, in some cases we made slight cosmetic changes to the
wording of the questions taken from the literature.
Overall, our sample of questions comprised the following
items: Two pairs from the classic CRT (Frederick, 2005), plus the
third original CRT item (without amatched non-conflict version)
to be able to compute a CRT score for each participant; two
pairs from the extended CRT by Toplak et al. (2014) (for other
questions it was not possible to create non-conflict versions); a
quartet referring to the conjunction fallacy; three pairs referring
to base-rate neglect; and one pair referring to the ratio bias.
In addition, we investigated several individual correlates of
the reliance on intuitive vs. deliberative decision making: Faith
in Intuition and Need for Cognition (Epstein et al., 1996),
Actively Open-Minded Thinking (Baron, 1993) (respectively
referred to as FI, NFC, and AOT hereafter), and the Big Five
personality scales (McCrae and Costa, 1985). We also controlled
for numerical literacy (Lipkus et al., 2001), gender, and individual
swiftness.
2.2. Participants
Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), a
standard online recruitment system for economic experiments
which allows for random recruitment from a predefined subject
pool. Participants were native German-speaking students from
the University of Cologne (Germany), excluding students
majoring in psychology or economics.We only considered native
speakers due to our focus on response times, since those are
critically related to participants’ language skills for the text-based
problems we used. In addition, our recruiting rules excluded
participants who had previously participated in any experiment
employing the CRT. A total of 158 participants (101 female;
age range 18 − 44, mean 23.44) participated in exchange for
performance-based payment plus a show-up fee of 4 Euros.
Three further participants had to be excluded from data analysis
because they did not comply with the instructions.
2.3. Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for
Economic Research (CLER) using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Experimental procedures were in accordance with the ethical
standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and its
later amendments, and also standard practices in experimental
economics (e.g., no-deception rule). In agreement with the ethics
and safety guidelines at the CLER, participants were all pre-
registered in the laboratory through ORSEE and had given
written informed consent regarding the laboratory’s guidelines
(no further informed consent is necessary for particular
experiments). Potential participants were informed of their right
to abstain from participation in the study or to withdraw consent
to participate at any time without reprisal.
In a first phase, participants were asked 21 incentivized
questions. Specifically, at the end of the experiment they
received 0.50 Euro cent for each correct answer. These questions
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comprised the (extended) CRT (9 items), the conjunction fallacy
(4 items), base-rate neglect (6 items), and the ratio bias (2 items).
All but two of the CRT items had to be answered in open
format. That is, participants were required to type their numerical
response into a blank box. The remaining two CRT items and
all other questions were multiple-choice items with two or more
possible answers each.
To control for possible order effects, participants were
randomly assigned to four different counterbalance conditions
(pseudo-randomized question order).1 For each pair, half of
the participants worked on the conflict version before the non-
conflict version, whereas the other half started with the non-
conflict version. In addition, for each participant, half of the item
pairs were first shown in the conflict version and later in the non-
conflict version, and vice versa for the other half of pairs. Further,
the two items of each pair were separated by at least three other
items.
In a second phase, participants worked on the 11 items of the
numeracy scale (Lipkus et al., 2001). They were informed that the
computer would randomly draw one of the 11 items at the end
of the experiment, and that they would receive 0.50 Euro cent if
their answer to the selected item was correct.
In a third phase, which was not incentivized, participants
completed the self-report questionnaires. Those included FI and
NFC (measured by means of the 10-item Rational-Experiential
Inventory; Epstein et al., 1996), the Big Five Inventory-SOEP
(15-item version; Gerlitz and Schupp, 2005), and AOT (7-item
version by Haran et al., 2013). Participants rated questionnaire
items by placing marks on continuous left-right scales ranging
from 0 (“completely false”) to 10 (“completely true”). An
exception was AOT, which was rated on a 7-point scale for each
item. Since participants might have been exposed to the CRT
items in their daily life (e.g., through the press or the internet),
we also asked them to indicate whether they had previously
seen each of the classic CRT items. Finally, the questionnaire
comprised socio-demographic questions (gender, age, and native
language).
No time limit was imposed; participants were free to use as
much time as needed for the incentivized questions and the
questionnaires. As a proxy for swiftness (see Cappelen et al.,
2015), we measured the time it took participants to read the brief
introductory instructions for phases one and two, and the time it
took them to answer the questions about age, gender, and native
language in phase three. The sum of these two measures (reading
time and demographic answer time in seconds) was used to create
an (inverse) index of swiftness.
Payment was computed at the end of the experiment. A
session lasted about 50 min and average earnings were 12.24
Euros (SD = 1.28).
2.4. Basic Hypotheses for Response Times
Our basic hypotheses concern the comparison of response times
for paired conflict and non-conflict questions. Following a dual-
process logic (e.g., the Dual-Process Diffusion Model of Alós-
Ferrer, 2016), the response time for a question where there is
1The counterbalance condition did not significantly affect participants’ response
times or responses to any of the questions.
a conflict between an intuitive and a deliberative process can
be decomposed in two parts. First, the time needed for conflict
detection and resolution. Second, the actual process time, that
is, the time needed by the process which actually generates the
response to do so. Let DC be the expected time necessary for
conflict detection and resolution in the presence of an actual
decision conflict. Further, let TH be the expected response time of
the intuitive (heuristic) process, and let TU > TH be the expected
response time of the deliberative (utilitarian) process (please note
that, to simplify notation, all quantities are expected times).
Actual response time will be the sum of conflict detection
and resolution time and process time. However, depending on
conflict resolution, the process actually delivering the response
might be either the intuitive or the deliberative one. Since we
only observe one decision for a given participant, the expected
response time is henceDC+TH orDC+TU , depending on which
process is selected. The problem, of course, is that the actually
selected process is unobservable. If a large enough set of answers
for a fixed question was observed, the total expected response
time would be
DC +1TH + (1−1)TU
where 1 is the probability that the intuitive process is the one
actually delivering the response.
These considerations are useful to derive experimental
hypotheses for the comparison of response times across
questions. Consider an alignment question where the conflict
has been removed because both processes prescribe the same
answer. Two effects can be expected. First, the conflict detection
and resolution time DC will be reduced, since there is no actual
conflict. Second, there will be an increase in the probability 1
that the faster, intuitive process is used, since there is no need
to inhibit it (or, in other words, we have more observations of
the type DC + TH than of the type DC + TU). Both effects point
in the same direction and deliver the following experimental
hypothesis.
H1. Response times for alignment questions are shorter than
response times for the analogous conflict questions.
Consider now a neutral question, where the intuitive process
has been shut down by removing the cue on which it acts. The
conflict detection and resolution time DC will also be reduced
in this case (absence of conflict). However, the probability that
the intuitive process is actually used becomes 1 = 0. Hence
response times will be shorter with respect to conflict detection
but all decisions will arise from the slower, deliberative process.
Evidence from neuroscience points out that conflict detection
and resolution occurs extremely early in decision making (see,
e.g., Achtziger et al., 2014) and hence should have a moderate
effect in response times of large magnitude. In Achtziger and
Alós-Ferrer (2014), decisions where a reinforcement heuristic
had been shut down were observed to be significantly slower
(and error rates significantly lower) than decisions where the
heuristic was active. On the basis of this evidence, we formulate
the following hypothesis.
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H2. Response times for neutral questions are longer than
response times for the analogous conflict questions.
However, alternative hypotheses might also be reasonable.
Following the interpretation of long response times as evidence
for deliberative struggle, one could speculate that the presence
of conflict in decisions as the ones considered here has an effect
beyond conflict detection and resolution. However, at this point
there is no empirical basis for a comparison of the magnitude of
this effect and the slowing-down of decisions in neutral questions
due to the shutdown of the intuitive process.
In one case, the non-conflict question involves the intuitive
process becoming prescriptively correct while the original
deliberative process is shut down (heuristic question). In this
case, again DC should be reduced, and either the likelihood of
the intuitive process being selected should become1 = 1, or the
deliberative process should be replaced with another, simpler and
presumably faster one. In both cases, we would expect to observe
faster decisions.
H3. Response times for heuristic questions are shorter than
response times for the analogous conflict questions.
3. DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
3.1. Summary Statistics and Gender Effects
Table 1 displays summary statistics for the main dependent
variables and reports the presence or absence of gender
differences (via Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests on the whole sample).
On average, participants correctly answered two out of the three
classic CRT items by Frederick (2005), and one out of the
two extended CRT items by Toplak et al. (2014). In line with
previous studies (Frederick, 2005; Oechssler et al., 2009; Brañas-
Garza et al., 2012; Alós-Ferrer and Hügelschäfer, 2016; Cueva
et al., 2016), males had significantly higher scores in the classic
three-item CRT; there was no difference concerning CRT2. The
results regarding pre-experimental knowledge of the classic CRT
imply that the test is becoming common knowledge in the
student population: 13.92% of participants reported knowing
one question, 26.58% two questions, and 36.08% all three.
Participants with more previous knowledge of the items obtain
significantly higher classic-CRT scores (Spearman’s correlation,
ρ = 0.307, p < 0.0001).
Descriptive statistics for the numeracy scale (Lipkus et al.,
2001) suggest that this measure is not particularly well-suited
to capture interindividual differences. It exhibits a very low
variance, with most of our participants answering either 10 or
11 out of 11 items correctly. Still, there is a significant gender
difference, pointing to higher numeracy for males. Regarding
personality traits, we find higher values of NFC for male
compared to female participants, in line with previous research
(Pacini and Epstein, 1999). Female participants have higher
scores for Extraversion andNeuroticism, which is consistent with
the literature (e.g., Feingold, 1994; Weisberg et al., 2011).
3.2. Personality Measures
Table 2 displays Spearman rank correlations among personality
traits. We include numerical literacy, but this measure shows
no correlation with any of the personality traits. In contrast to
theoretical assumptions of the Rational-Experiential Inventory
(REI) (Epstein, 1994; Epstein et al., 1996), there is a weak positive
correlation between FI and NFC in our sample (Spearman’s
correlation, ρ = 0.14, p = 0.079). Concerning the relation
between the REI and the Big Five, we found that FI is positively
associated with Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness,
and Extraversion, while NFC is positively correlated with
Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness, and negatively
with Neuroticism. These results are perfectly consistent with the
findings of Pacini and Epstein (1999). The significant positive
correlations of AOT with NFC and Openness are in line with
results by Haran et al. (2013).
4. EXTENDED CRT QUESTIONS
For the analysis of response times, in a first step we removed
outliers in order to exclude abnormal observations that might
bias the results. To this end, we removed, for each item, response
times that deviated more than two standard deviations from
the respective mean of the whole sample of participants (see
Miller, 1991, on this). This led to the exclusion of several very
slow responses, but not of very fast ones. Further, we excluded
response times of zero, which resulted from a few participants
accidentally skipping a question by double-clicking. Hence, for
every paired-observations test across the two questions in a pair,
participants whose response times were outliers in either of the
two questions are removed. In order to test our hypotheses
on response times, we use non-parametric, two-tailed Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank tests (for paired observations). To compare error
rates across the two questions in a pair, we rely on McNemar’s
chi-squared test, which is based on the number of discordant
pairs. For ease of presentation, instead of repeating the exclusion
criteria for every single item pair, we report for each test the
corresponding N, that is, the number of participants with valid
response times in both of the two questions. The number of
exclusions for each test is simply the difference between the
reported number of observations and the total sample size of
N = 158.
4.1. Question-Level Analysis
In the following subsections we present the CRT questions
used in the present study, together with the corresponding
analyses of error rates and response times of the matched
pairs. For each pair we briefly outline the rationale behind the
conflict version and the construction of the non-conflict version.
Given the frame modification that some of the original CRT
questions underwent to minimize recognizability, we report the
text (English translation of the German items) also for those
original CRT questions.
4.1.1. The Bat and the Ball: Conflict vs. Heuristic
The first pair of questions presented corresponded to the famous
“bat and the ball” problem (Frederick, 2005). A non-conflict
version of this question has been previously studied by De Neys
et al. (2013) and Johnson et al. (2016).
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TABLE 1 | Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Min. Max. Mean (females) Mean (males) WRT for gender effects
NR. OF CORRECT ANSWERS
Total 16.475 10 22 16.149 17.053 z = −2.35,p = 0.019**
(2.568) (2.475) (2.649)
Classic CRT 2.025 0 3 1.851 2.333 z = −2.88,p = 0.004***
(1.009) (1.043) (0.873)
CRT2 1.38 0 2 1.366 1.404 z = −0.08,p = 0.936
(0.683) (0.717) (0.623)
Conjunction fallacy 3.076 1 4 3.05 3.123 z = −0.63,p = 0.529
(0.878) (0.865) (0.908)
Base-rate neglect 3.816 1 6 3.772 3.895 z = −0.83,p = 0.409
(0.943) (0.937) (0.958)
Ratio bias 1.892 1 2 1.871 1.93 z = −1.14,p = 0.256
(0.311) (0.337) (0.258)
Numeracy 9.652 5 11 9.386 10.122 z = −3.38,p = 0.001***
(1.391) (1.150) (1.449)
PERSONALITY TRAITS
Faith in intuition 6.354 1.94 10 6.313 6.427 z = −0.44,p = 0.660
(1.568) (1.596) (1.528)
Need for cognition 6.096 2.08 9.84 5.905 6.435 z = −2.22,p = 0.027**
(1.372) (1.462) (1.131)
Openness to experience 5.764 1.333 9.467 5.808 5.685 z = 0.45,p = 0.651
(1.861) (1.849) (1.895)
Conscientiousness 6.391 0.333 10 6.359 6.449 z = −0.13,p = 0.901
(1.889) (1.857) (1.96)
Extraversion 6.289 0.433 10 6.549 5.829 z = 2.00,p = 0.046**
(2.298) (2.258) (2.318)
Agreeableness 6.850 2.1 10 6.774 6.985 z = −0.68,p = 0.500
(1.729) (1.718) (1.755)
Neuroticism 5.547 0 10 5.942 4.847 z = 2.87,p = 0.004***
(2.251) (2.024) (2.473)
Actively open- 4.927 2.142 6 4.915 4.950 z = −1.25,p = 0.211
minded thinking (4.783) (4.318) (5.55)
Known CRT items 1.753 0 3 1.653 1.93 z = −1.49,p = 0.137
(1.177) (1.178) (1.163)
Swiftness 94.546 36.941 169.449 95.178 93.426 z = 0.48,p = 0.631
(29.205) (28.815) (30.110)
Nr. of Correct Answers only refers to the conflict versions of the questions. The variable Classic CRT refers to the three original items of Frederick (2005). The variable CRT2 refers to
the two extended-CRT conflict questions taken from Toplak et al. (2014). Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
(Q1C) A postcard and a pen cost 110 cents in total. The
postcard costs 100 cents more than the pen. How much
does the pen cost? (In cents)
[correct answer = 5]
(Q1H) A magazine and a banana together cost 290 cents. The
magazine costs 200 cents. What is the price of the
banana? (In cents)
[correct answer = 90]
For the classic (Q1C) question, there is an intuitive but wrong
answer (“10”). This presumably involves participants focusing on
the numbers, quickly segmenting the 110 cents into 100 and 10
cents, thereby neglecting the “more than” statement. Question
(Q1H) provides a control version of the problem, developed by
De Neys et al. (2013). By eliminating the words “more than” from
the question, it allows the intuitive segmentation mechanism
to produce the correct answer. At the same time, however,
the computation process that provides the correct solution in
(Q1C) cannot be applied in this problem anymore. It becomes
entirely inappropriate, since the solution is transparent. Hence
this non-conflict version of the question (which, to the best of
our knowledge, follows the obvious way to remove the conflict),
neither generates process alignment nor shuts down the intuitive
process. Rather, it corresponds to the heuristic question case we
have described above.
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TABLE 2 | Spearman correlations among personality traits (and numeracy).
1. Num 2. FI 3. NFC 4. Open 5. Consc 6. Extra 7. Agree 8. Neuro
2. FI 0.067 –
3. NFC −0.107 0.140* –
4. Open 0.102 0.443*** 0.190** –
5. Consc 0.047 0.163** 0.246** 0.034 –
6. Extra −0.038 0.261*** 0.053 0.165** 0.154 –
7. Agree 0.129 0.034 −0.030 0.130 0.090 0.043 –
8. Neuro −0.057 −0.072 −0.226** −0.065 −0.065 −0.223*** 0.033 –
9. AOT 0.049 0.062 0.266*** 0.191** 0.074 −0.003 0.226*** −0.003
Num, Numeracy; FI, Faith in intuition; NFC, Need for cognition; Open, Openness to experience; Consc, Conscientiousness; Extra, Extraversion; Agree, Agreeableness; Neuro,
Neuroticism; AOT, Actively open-minded thinking. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Figure 1 depicts the percentages of errors and correct
responses (panel A) and the response times (panel B).
Participants’ answers to the conflict question were significantly
slower than their answers to the heuristic question (median
response time 29.14 s, mean 34.38 s, SD = 22.00 in case of
conflict; median 17.29 s, mean 18.71 s, SD = 6.42 for the heuristic
question; WSR test, N = 141, z = 7.55, p < 0.001). This is
consistent with hypothesis H3.
There were significantly more errors in the conflict question
than in the heuristic version. For (Q1C), there were 39.72% (56)
heuristic errors, 2.13% (3) non-heuristic errors (responses other
than five or ten), and 58.16% (82) correct answers. For (Q1H), all
answers were correct. Unsurprisingly, the proportion of errors in
the conflict question was significantly larger than in the heuristic
question [McNemar’s test, N = 141, χ2
(1)
= 59.00, p < 0.001].
4.1.2. Making Widgets: Conflict vs. Neutral
The second pair of questions again corresponds to one of the
classic CRT items of Frederick (2005). The non-conflict version
corresponds to our neutral category.
(Q2C) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 car tires, how
long would it take 100 machines to make 100 car tires?
(In minutes)
[correct answer = 5]
(Q2N) If it takes 60 machines 100 minutes to make 60 bricks,
how long would it take 100 machines to make 100
bricks? (In minutes)
[correct answer = 100]
The number repetition in (Q2C) induces many participants to
complete the pattern and give the intuitive but wrong answer
“100.” (Q2N) provides a control version where the pattern
is broken. By excluding the possibility of recognizing and
reproducing a simple pattern, (Q2N) excludes the possibility
of using a heuristic shortcut as in (Q2C). However, the same
computation process that provides the correct solution in the
conflict version can still be applied in this problem. Therefore,
(Q2N) is a neutral counterpart of the conflict item (Q2C).
Figure 1 depicts the percentages of errors and correct
responses (panel A) and the response times (panel B). Answers to
the conflict question were significantly faster than the answers to
the neutral question (median response time 21.61 s, mean 27.08 s,
SD = 18.10 in case of conflict; median 37.16 s, mean 48.69 s,
SD = 33.07 for the neutral question; WSR test, N = 139, z =
−7.68, p < 0.001). This is in agreement with our Hypothesis H2.
Regarding choice data, for (Q2C) there were 23.02% (32)
heuristic errors, 5.04% (7) non-heuristic errors, and 71.94% (100)
correct answers. For (Q2N), there were 22.30% (31) errors, and
77.70% (108) correct answers. According to McNemar’s test, the
proportion of errors in the conflict question was not significantly
different than in the neutral question [N = 139, χ2
(1)
= 2.29,
p = 0.131]. Please note, however, that throughout the paper we
rely on two-sided tests. If we used a one-sided test here (based
on our directional prediction), the result would of course be
(marginally) significant.
4.1.3. Buying and Selling: Conflict vs. Alignment
The third pair of questions we used was taken from the extended-
CRT questions of Toplak et al. (2014), for which we developed an
alignment version.
(Q3C) Aman buys a pig for 60 Euros, sells it for 70 Euros, buys
it back for 80 Euros, and finally sells it for 90 Euros. How
much has he made? (In Euros)
[correct answer = 20]
(Q3A) Aman buys a cow for 60 Euros, sells it for 70 Euros, buys
it back for 70 Euros, and finally sells it for 90 Euros. How
much has he made? (In Euros)
[correct answer = 30]
For the (Q3C) question, there is an intuitive but wrong answer
(“10”). This is due to a miscalculation of the earnings where
the difference between each two consecutive buying or selling
actions is computed, instead of computing the profits or losses
from every buy-and-sell operation. That is, participants compute
(70−60)+(70−80)+(90−80) = 10 instead of (70−60)+(90−
80) = 20. In (Q3A), by having equal numbers in the middle of
the question, this heuristic but incorrect way of thinking provides
the correct answer. Importantly, the computation process that
provides the correct solution is the same in (Q3C) and (Q3A).
Therefore (Q3A) is an alignment counterpart of the conflict
item (Q3C).
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Error rates (in %) and (B) mean response times (in seconds) for CRT questions. Reported significance refers to McNemar’s tests for error rates and to
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests for response times. **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Figure 1 depicts the percentages of errors and correct
responses (panel A) and the response times (panel B). Answers
to the conflict question were significantly slower than the answers
to the alignment question (median response time 33.74 s, mean
38.23 s, SD = 18.40 in case of conflict; 28.92 s, mean 32.66 s,
SD = 15.03 in case of alignment; WSR test, N = 144, z =
2.42, p = 0.015). This is in agreement with our Hypothesis H1.
Alignment of course produces a simpler question, since the
intuitive process becomes a cognitive shortcut. It was hence
expected that there would be less errors under alignment. For
(Q3C), there were 29.17% (42) heuristic errors, 15.27% (22) non-
heuristic errors, and 55.56% (80) correct answers. For (Q3A),
there were 27.08% (39) errors, and 72.92% (105) correct answers.
According to McNemar’s test, the proportion of errors in the
conflict question was significantly larger than in the alignment
question [N = 144, χ2
(1)
= 15.24, p < 0.001].
4.1.4. Up and Down: Conflict vs. Alignment
The fourth pair of questions presented to participants is the
seventh item in the list of extended CRT questions by Toplak
et al. (2014), which follows a multiple-choice format. Our non-
conflict version follows one developed by Bieleke and Gollwitzer
for a different purpose (manuscript in preparation).
(Q4C) In January, Lucas invested 8000 Euros in the stock
market. In July, the stocks he had purchased were down
50%. Fortunately, from July to October, they went up
75%. In October, Lucas
◦ has broken even in the stock market.
◦ is ahead of where he began.
◦ has lost money.
[correct answer = has lost money]
(Q4A) On Monday, the temperature was 22◦C in the shade.
Two days later, the temperature was down by 50%.
Fortunately, the temperature went up 125% again by
Saturday. Compared to Monday, the temperature on
Saturday is
◦ warmer.
◦ the same.
◦ colder.
[correct answer= warmer]
In this problem, participants typically focus on the fact that the
later percentage increase is larger than the earlier percentage
decrease, neglecting that the amount to which the increase is
applied is not the starting amount. Hence, many participants
erroneously select the second option in (Q4C). In (Q4A), by
making the percentage increase larger, the heuristic shortcut
provides the correct answer even if the way of thinking is
erroneous. Still, the correct answer can also be reached by means
of the same computation mechanism that is required to correctly
answer (Q4C). Therefore, (Q4A) is an alignment counterpart of
the conflict item (Q4C).
Figure 1 depicts the percentages of errors and correct
responses (panel A) and the response times (panel B). Answers
to the conflict question were significantly slower than the answers
to the alignment question (median response time 35.95 s, mean
38.32 s, SD = 15.06 in case of conflict; median 33.24 s, mean
35.25 s, SD = 13.50 in case of alignment; WSR test, N =
152, z = 2.25, p = 0.024). Again, this is in agreement with our
Hypothesis H1.
As in the previous pair, there were significantly less errors
under alignment. For (Q4C), there were 16.45% (25) heuristic
errors, 1.32% (2) non-heuristic errors, and 82.24% (125) correct
answers. For (Q4A), there were 5.92% (9) errors, and 94.08%
(143) correct answers. According to McNemar’s test, the
proportion of errors in the conflict question was significantly
larger than in the alignment question [N = 152, χ2
(1)
= 9.00,
p = 0.003].
4.1.5. Growing in the Lake
In order to be able to compute the standard CRT score, we also
included the last of the classic three CRT items of Frederick
(2005).
(Q5C) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover
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the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to
cover half of the lake? (In days)
[correct answer= 47]
For this question, there is an intuitive but wrong answer
(“24”), produced by halving the number of days, ignoring the
exponential growth of the lily pads. The structure of the question
makes it impossible to create a non-conflict version without
making it exceedingly trivial. Hence, this item was not paired
with a non-conflict version.
After removing response-time outliers, our sample for the
(Q5C) question contains N = 149 observations. The median
response time was 27.33 s, mean 31.85 s, SD = 16.79 (Figure 1B).
There were 15.44% (23) heuristic errors, 5.37% (8) non-heuristic
errors, and 79.19% (118) correct answers (Figure 1A).
4.2. Regression Analysis for Extended CRT
Questions
Our data forms a perfectly balanced panel with 9 decisions per
participant. Hence we rely on random-effects panel regressions.
This allows us to control for a variety of variables that might
affect choices or response times, such as the number of words
and letters and participants’ swiftness.
Table 3 displays the results of panel regressions for response
times. Contrary to the individual tests, we did not drop
participants with outlier response times. Dropping those
participants would have greatly reduced the sample since the
regression covers all questions simultaneously. Instead, we relied
on random effects and a log-transformation of response times
(and controlling for swiftness). We only had to drop one of
the participants from the whole sample because he left one of
the answers blank. Model 1 contains dummies for the different
versions of questions (heuristic, neutral, and alignment; conflict
is the reference category). All dummies are significant, implying
longer response times for neutral questions and shorter response
times for heuristic and alignment questions, in agreement with
Hypotheses H1, H2, and H3. Further, they remain significant
when controlling for interindividual heterogeneity (Model 2).
Not surprisingly, previous knowledge of the classic CRT items
reduces response times.
In Model 3, we introduce dummies for intuitive and non-
intuitive errors. The results imply that participants making
non-intuitive errors are slower. A post-hoc test further shows
that participants making an intuitive error under conflict are
significantly slower than those giving the correct answer under
conflict (coefficient 0.167, SD = 0.060, z = 2.84, p = 0.004).
However, there was no difference between those committing an
error and those giving a correct answer under alignment (post-
hoc test, coefficient 0.004, SD = 0.044, z = 0.10, p = 0.923).
In any case, this should not be confused with a statement on
the relative speed of errors, which would be a within-subject
comparison. Since this is a comparison across subjects, it merely
points out that participants giving incorrect answers might be
cognitively slower than participants giving correct answers.
We now turn to random-effects probit panel regressions on
correct answers to the CRT questions (Table 4). As expected,
the likelihood of a correct answer is higher in the absence of
TABLE 3 | Random-effects regressions on log response times of CRT
questions.
Log(response time) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Heuristic −0.438*** −0.438*** −0.356***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.073)
Neutral 0.443*** 0.443*** 0.482***
(0.158) (0.159) (0.157)
Alignment −0.063* −0.063* −0.002
(0.037) (0.038) (0.035)
Number of words 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Number of letters 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(swiftness) 0.101* 0.103*
(0.053) (0.061)
Numeracy −0.040 −0.026
(0.033) (0.030)
Male 0.057 0.053
(0.058) (0.053)
Known CRT items −0.114*** −0.109***
(0.036) (0.037)
Faith in intuition −0.006 −0.007
(0.016) (0.016)
Need for cognition −0.020 −0.018
(0.018) (0.020)
Openness to experience −0.005 −0.006
(0.016) (0.016)
Conscientiousness −0.022*** −0.021***
(0.006) (0.007)
Extraversion 0.022*** 0.020***
(0.003) (0.003)
Agreeableness 0.014 0.017
(0.010) (0.012)
Neuroticism 0.009 0.006
(0.010) (0.010)
Actively open-minded thinking 0.022 0.020
(0.028) (0.033)
Non-intuitive error 0.458***
(0.027)
Intuitive error 0.167***
(0.059)
Intuitive error × alignment −0.163**
(0.073)
Observations 1413 1413 1413
The dummies Heuristic, Neutral, and Alignment take the value 1 for the respective versions
of the questions; Conflict is the reference category. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
(conservatively) clustered at the level of counterbalance condition (question order).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
conflict, as reflected by a dummy pooling alignment, neutral,
and heuristic questions. Participants scoring high in numeracy
are more likely to answer the CRT questions correctly, in spite
of the low variance in this scale. There is also a gender effect,
with males providing correct responses more often. However,
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TABLE 4 | Random-effects probit regressions on correct answers to CRT
questions.
Correct answer Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Male 0.259** 0.119 0.118 0.026
(0.123) (0.144) (0.144) (0.130)
Non-conflict 0.632*** 0.629*** 0.931** 0.923**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.373) (0.377)
Faith in intuition (FI) −0.007 −0.018 0.006
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
Need for cognition (NFC) 0.010 0.039 0.026
(0.033) (0.041) (0.036)
Numeracy 0.186*** 0.185*** 0.187***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Non-conflict × FI 0.029 0.031
(0.026) (0.027)
Non-conflict × NFC −0.080 −0.081
(0.063) (0.063)
Openness to experience −0.051*
(0.030)
Conscientiousness 0.030
(0.035)
Extraversion -0.022
(0.023)
Agreeableness 0.071***
(0.022)
Neuroticism -0.053***
(0.012)
Actively open-minded thinking −0.009
(0.048)
Observations 1413 1413 1413 1413
The dummy Non-Conflict subsumes alignment, neutral, and heuristic problems; Conflict
is the reference category. Standard errors (in parentheses) are (conservatively) clustered
at the level of counterbalance condition (question order).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
once FI, NFC, and numerical literacy are included (Model 2),
the gender difference disappears. Effects remain significant when
controlling for further heterogeneity, including the Big Five and
AOT (Model 4).
4.3. Discussion: Extended CRT Questions
Response times are typically in the 15 − 35 s range, which is
considerably longer than response times studied in the dual-
process literature. Hence, it is clear that practically all decisions
involve deliberation and no relevant part of the observations
can be viewed exclusively as the result of a fast, automatic
(intuitive or heuristic) process in the sense of the dual-process
literature (Epstein, 1994; Strack and Deutsch, 2004). However, a
mechanistic interpretation of process conflict and alignment, as
given in Section 2.4, might still help organize and understand the
data.
The predictions derived from this interpretation (Section 2.4)
were clearly supported by the data. Overall, the study of response
times related to CRT questions suggests that even at this long time
scale, this kind of questions fall well within the domain of dual-
process theories. It is conceptually useful to identify behavioral
tendencies with decision processes and consider intuitive ones as
more automatic (hence faster) processes.
When analyzing response times, a large individual
heterogeneity has to be expected, and differences will become
more important at longer time scales. The regression analysis
confirmed our basic findings while controlling for individual
differences, including a number of personality factors, and
an individual measure of swiftness (which was, as expected,
significant). To study actual choices, we also conducted probit
regressions on individual answers, which showed the expected
effects, e.g., non-conflict question versions were easier.
The regressions also allowed us to examine the influence of
personality factors on behavior. Interestingly, scales as FI, NFC,
and AOT had no impact on CRT questions (neither on answers
nor on response times), in agreement with previous evidence that
these measures appear to diverge greatly at the individual level
(Alós-Ferrer and Hügelschäfer, 2016). However, the inclusion of
these measures eliminates apparent gender effects, pointing out
that gender differences in performance in CRT-style questions
might be explained by personality differences correlated with
gender. Regarding the Big-Five Inventory, Conscientiousness
led to faster responses and Extraversion to slower ones, but
neither had a significant effect on responses. Agreeableness
led to significantly more correct answers and Neuroticism and
Openness to Experience to more errors, but none of them had a
significant effect on response times.
Finally, it is important to note that the items we have
considered (as the ones related to decision biases analyzed in the
next section) belong to the category of decisions from inference, in
the sense that there is an objectively correct answer which needs
to be identified. This is in contrast to preferential choice, where by
definition there is no objectively correct response (for example,
consider lottery-choice questions). For decisions from inference,
it is in principle possible to derive natural hypotheses on the
nature of the involved processes in advance, as our discussions
above illustrate. For preferential choice, the picture is less clear,
because the very nature of the involved processes is part of the
research question. We will return to this point in the discussion.
5. DECISION BIASES
In the following subsections we present the questions capturing
the decision biases investigated in the present study, together
with the corresponding analyses of error rates and response times
of the matched items. For each question we report the English
translation of the German items we used, and briefly outline the
rationale behind the conflict version and the construction of the
non-conflict version. The same criteria for outliers and tests were
used as in Section 4.
To explore the influence of personality factors, we also test
whether participants’ proneness to decision biases is related
to their CRT, FI, and NFC scores, following Alós-Ferrer
and Hügelschäfer (2012, 2016). In particular, Alós-Ferrer and
Hügelschäfer (2016) observed that higher CRT scores were linked
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TABLE 5 | Random-effects probit regressions on correct answers to
decision-bias questions.
Correct answer BRN1 BRN2 BRN3 Conj. fall. Ratio bias
Classic CRT 0.535 −0.025 0.320** 0.379*** 0.513***
(0.764) (0.109) (0.144) (0.113) (0.161)
CRT2 0.708 0.211 0.401* −0.113 −0.138
(1.112) (0.165) (0.216) (0.169) (0.237)
Faith in intuition 0.198 0.133* 0.036 0.070 0.088
(0.508) (0.069) (0.085) (0.070) (0.102)
Need for cognition 0.246 −0.035 0.102 −0.054 −0.144
(0.543) (0.083) (0.102) (0.081) (0.117)
Observations 158 158 158 158 158
Correct Answer refers to the conflict version of the respective questions. BRN1-3
indicate the three base-rate-neglect problems. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
(conservatively) clustered at the level of counterbalance condition (question order).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
to a lower likelihood of committing the conjunction fallacy and
base-rate neglect, in line with previous research (Oechssler et al.,
2009; Hoppe and Kusterer, 2011). Similarly, lower FI scores were
associated with a lower likelihood of these biases, albeit not as
consistently as CRT scores. Whereas those results were based
on median splits, we ran random-effects probit regressions in
order to take advantage of the full range of scores, regressing
correct answers to the conflict versions of the bias questions on
participants’ CRT, FI, and NFC score. We defined the additional
variable CRT2 as the score in the two additional conflict items
taken from Toplak et al. (2014) (hence, CRT2 can take the values
0, 1, or 2). Results are shown in Table 5 and are discussed in the
respective subsections below.
5.1. Base-Rate Neglect
The first group of questions on decision biases refers to base-
rate neglect. This phenomenon occurs when decision makers
overweight sample information at the expense of the base rate.
To examine this bias, we used three pairs of questions.
5.1.1. Taxicabs and Base-Rate Neglect: Conflict vs.
Alignment
The first question is the celebrated “Taxicab question” from
Kahneman and Tversky (1972), studied by Tversky and
Kahneman (1980) and Bar-Hillel (1980), which we implemented
as a multiple-choice problem.
(BR1C) In a city there are two cab companies, the Green and
the Blue. 85% of the cabs in the city are Green and
15% are Blue. A cab was involved in a hit-and-run
accident last night. A witness identified the cab as a Blue
cab. The court tested his ability to distinguish between
Green and Blue cabs at night. The witness made correct
identifications in 80% of the cases and erred in 20% of
the cases. The probability that the cab involved in the
accident was Blue rather than Green is
◦ larger than 50%.
◦ smaller than 50%.
(BR1A) In a city there are two limousine companies, the Yellow
and the Pink. 60% of the limousines in the city are
Yellow and 40% are Pink. A limousine was involved in
a hit-and-run accident last night. A witness identified
the limousine as a Yellow. The court tested his ability
to distinguish between Yellow and Pink limousines
at night. The witness made correct identifications in
70% of the cases and erred in 30% of the cases. The
probability that the limousine involved in the accident
was Yellow rather than Pink is
◦ larger than 50%.
◦ smaller than 50%.
Bayes’ Rule yields a posterior probability of ∼ 41% in the
conflict version (BR1C), and a probability of ∼ 78% in
the alignment version (BR1A). However, in studies involving
probability estimates, median answers in (BR1C) are typically
around 80% (e.g., Bar-Hillel, 1980). This is because decision
makers typically underweight the base rate, and their answers
are dominated by the witness’ credibility instead. Hence, for
(BR1C), the intuitive but normatively wrong answer is to choose
the first option (larger than 50%). In (BR1A), by increasing
the base rate, the same heuristic that misled participants in
(BR1C) now provides the correct answer. Therefore (BR1A)
is an alignment counterpart of the conflict item (BR1C). We
remark that Bar-Hillel (1980) developed a different and more
extreme non-conflict version, but we developed our own because
in that version, the statement of a witness is replaced by more
specific information which actually dominates the base rate, so
that neglecting the base rate is appropriate.
Figure 2 depicts the percentages of errors and correct
responses (panel A) and the response times (panel B). Answers
to the conflict question were significantly slower than the answers
to the alignment question (median response time 43.73 s, mean
46.78 s, SD = 19.13 in case of conflict; 38.70 s, mean 42.23 s,
SD = 14.43 in case of alignment; WSR test, N = 146, z = 2.01,
p = 0.044), in agreement with our basic Hypothesis H1.
Regarding error rates, for the conflict question (BR1C), there
were 61.64% (90) errors, and 38.36% (56) correct answers. For
(BR1A), there were 27.40% (40) errors, and 72.60% (106) correct
answers. As is to be expected for a comparison between a
conflict and an alignment version, the proportion of errors in the
conflict question was significantly larger than in the alignment
question [McNemar’s test, N = 146, χ2
(1)
= 27.17, p <
0.001].
Last, we report on the relation to the CRT and the FI and NFC
scales. Alós-Ferrer and Hügelschäfer (2016) found that the CRT
had no informative value for the base-rate fallacy as captured by
this particular question. We obtain the same null result. There
were no effects of CRT score, FI or NFC on the likelihood of
correctly answering the conflict version of this question (BR1C)
(see Table 5).
5.1.2. Detecting Criminals and Base-Rate Neglect:
Conflict vs. Alignment
The next pair of questions used to measure base-rate neglect
is analogous to a classic problem from Eddy (1982) and has
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Error rates (in %) and (B) mean response times (in seconds) for base-rate-neglect questions. Reported significance refers to McNemar’s tests for error
rates and to Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests for response times. **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
been used by Hoppe and Kusterer (2011) and Alós-Ferrer and
Hügelschäfer (2016).
(BR2C) In a city with 10 criminals and 10,000 innocent citizens
there is a surveillance camera with an automatic face
recognition software. If the camera sees a known
criminal, it will trigger the alarm with 70% probability;
if the camera sees an innocent citizen, it will trigger
the alarm with a probability of 30%. The probability
that indeed a criminal was filmed when the alarm is
triggered is
◦ larger than 50%.
◦ smaller than 50%.
(BR2A) In a prison with 9000 criminals and 90 innocent people
appeals to court take place regularly. When an appeal
happens, it will sentence guilty a criminal with 75%
probability; if the trial involves an innocent citizen, it
will sentence him guilty with a probability of 25%. The
probability that indeed a criminal was sentenced if the
appeal judged him guilty is
◦ larger than 50%.
◦ smaller than 50%.
The posterior probability in the (BR2C) question is only ∼ 23%,
but due to base-rate neglect participants typically overweight the
reliability of the test. Hence, the intuitive but incorrect response
is to select the first option. In (BR2A), by increasing the base rate
to put it in agreement with the diagnostic information, the same
heuristic that misled participants in (BR2C) now provides the
correct answer. Therefore (BR2A) is an alignment counterpart of
the conflict item (BR2C).
Figure 2 depicts the percentages of errors and correct
responses (panel A) and the response times (panel B). Answers
to the conflict question were significantly faster than the answers
to the alignment version (median response time 30.63 s, mean
34.38 s, SD = 15.95 in case of conflict; 34.80 s, mean 36.45 s,
SD = 11.77 in case of alignment; WSR test, N = 138, z = 2.08,
p = 0.037). This is inconsistent with the results for the previous
question pair and with our Hypothesis H1.
Error rates, however, do not suggest a qualitative difference
with the previous pair. For (BR2C) there were 39.86% (55)
errors, and 60.14% (83) correct answers. For (BR2A) there were
5.80% (8) errors, and 94.20% (130) correct answers. According to
McNemar’s test, the proportion of errors in the conflict question
was significantly larger than in the alignment question [N = 138,
χ2
(1)
= 37.44, p < 0.001].
As shown in Table 5, participants’ CRT score did not affect
the likelihood of a correct answer to the (BRC2) item, in
contradiction with the results by Hoppe and Kusterer (2011) and
Alós-Ferrer and Hügelschäfer (2016). In the same way, NFC was
not predictive for this item. FI level was predictive, but not in the
expected direction (marginally significantly higher likelihood of
answering correctly with higher FI level).
5.1.3. Genetic Disorders and Base-Rate Neglect:
Conflict vs. Alignment
The third pair of items is based on the original question of Eddy
(1982).
(BR3C) Jonathan has been tested for a rare genetic disorder
at his doctor. Only one in 10,000 people have this
disorder. The test has very high detection rate: 99%.
That means if Jonathan has the disorder, there is a 99%
chance that the test is positive. The test also has a very
low false-positive rate: 1%. That means that if Jonathan
does not have the disorder, there is only a 1% chance
that the test is positive. Unfortunately, Jonathan has
tested positive for this disorder. The probability with
which Jonathan has the genetic disorder is
◦ larger than 50%.
◦ smaller than 50%.
(BR3A) A doctor has tested a population of obese patients for
high cholesterol in the blood. 8000 in 10,000 obese
people have high cholesterol. The test has a very high
detection rate: 95%. That means if a patient has high
cholesterol, there is a 95% chance that the test is
positive. The test also has a very low false-positive rate:
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5%. That means that if a patient does not have high
cholesterol, there is only a 5% chance that the test
is positive. A patient has been tested positive for this
condition. The probability with which the patient has
high cholesterol is
◦ larger than 50%.
◦ smaller than 50%.
The logic here is the same as for (BR2C) and (BR2A). The
posterior probability in the (BR3C) question is only around ∼
1%, but participants are tempted to select the first option. Due to
the altered base rate, (BR3A) is an alignment counterpart of the
conflict item (BR3C).
Figure 2 depicts the percentages of errors and correct
responses (panel A) and the response times (panel B). Response
times of answers to the conflict question were not significantly
different from those to the alignment question (median response
time 32.32 s, mean 37.22 s, SD = 18.47 in case of conflict; median
31.57 s, mean 35.38 s, SD = 14.77 in case of alignment; WSR
test, N = 144, z = 0.62, p = 0.536). Hence, with respect to
our Hypothesis H1, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
differences in this case.
As in the case of the previous pair of questions, however,
choice data reflect the normal difference between a conflict and
an alignment version. For (BR3C), there were 84.97% (122)
errors, and 15.28% (22) correct answers. For (BR3A), there were
4.17% (6) errors, and 95.83% (138) correct answers. According to
McNemar’s test, the proportion of errors in the conflict question
was significantly larger than in the alignment question [N = 144,
χ2
(1)
= 114.03, p < 0.001].
A higher CRT score significantly increased the likelihood of
giving a correct answer to (BR3C) (see Table 5). The effect was
significant when considering the classic CRT, and marginally
significant when considering the two items from the extended
CRT contained in CRT2. There was no effect of FI or NFC scores.
5.1.4. Regression Analysis (Base-Rate Neglect)
Our data forms a perfectly balanced panel with 6 decisions
per participant. Table 6 reports random-effects panel regressions
on response times, transformed logarithmically. Answers to the
alignment versions are significantly slower, also when controlling
for personality traits (Model 2). Swiftness is again predictive
of the time participants need to work on the base-rate-neglect
questions. There is a significant gender effect, suggesting that
females are faster in answering the problems.
Regarding choice data, we ran random-effects probit panel
regressions on correct answers to the base-rate-neglect items
(Table 7). The variable conflict is significant across all models,
indicating an increased likelihood of giving a correct answer to
alignment compared to conflict questions. The score obtained
in the classic CRT does not affect correct answers across all
base-rate-neglect questions (Model 2). Controlling for conflict
(Model 3), we obtain the unexpected result that there is a
significant negative effect of CRT score on the likelihood of
correct answers to alignment questions. Further, the CRT score
does not significantly predict a correct answer to the conflict
versions (Model 3; post-hoc test of the linear combination of
TABLE 6 | Random-effects regressions on log response times of
base-rate-neglect questions.
Log(response time) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Alignment 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.126***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.027)
Number of words 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of letters −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Swiftness 0.174*** 0.170***
(0.067) (0.064)
Numeracy 0.041** 0.042**
(0.020) (0.020)
Male 0.156*** 0.152***
(0.050) (0.043)
Faith in intuition 0.004 0.004
(0.019) (0.019)
Need for cognition −0.015 −0.014
(0.025) (0.026)
Openness to experience 0.012* 0.011
(0.007) (0.008)
Conscientiousness −0.004 −0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Extraversion 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001)
Agreeableness −0.008 −0.008
(0.029) (0.029)
Neuroticism 0.014 0.015
(0.016) (0.017)
Actively open-minded thinking 0.010 0.010
(0.050) (0.049)
Error −0.053
(0.090)
Error × alignment 0.114
(0.145)
Observations 942 942 942
The dummy Alignment takes the value 1 for the respective versions of the questions;
Conflict is the reference category. Standard errors (in parentheses) are (conservatively)
clustered at the level of counterbalance condition (question order).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Classic CRT plus Conflict × Classic CRT: coefficient 0.010,
SD = 0.057, z = 0.17, p = 0.861). In contrast, the score
obtained in the two items of CRT2 is a significant positive
predictor for correctly answering to the alignment versions
of the questions, and also for the conflict versions (Model 3;
post-hoc test of the linear combination of CRT2 plus Conflict
× CRT2: coefficient 0.135, SD = 0.059, z = 2.30, p =
0.022). Results remain stable when including personality traits
(Model 4).
5.1.5. Discussion (Base-Rate Neglect)
Response times for questions focusing on base-rate neglect
were clearly longer than for the typical CRT questions, with
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TABLE 7 | Random-effects probit regressions on correct answers to
base-rate-neglect questions.
Correct answer Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Male 0.032 0.016 0.015 0.014
(0.134) (0.129) (0.130) (0.153)
Conflict −1.377*** −1.391*** −1.639*** -1.662**
(0.133) (0.174) (0.518) (0.648)
Classic CRT −0.037 −0.116*** −0.130*
(0.043) (0.041) (0.072)
CRT2 0.150*** 0.174*** 0.209***
(0.038) (0.054) (0.070)
Faith in intuition 0.041 0.050 0.032
(0.046) (0.059) (0.058)
Need for cognition 0.008 −0.005 −0.017
(0.026) (0.079) (0.061)
Numeracy 0.032 0.033 0.030
(0.036) (0.037) (0.034)
Conflict × classic CRT 0.126** 0.132*
(0.052) (0.071)
Conflict × CRT2 −0.039 −0.045
(0.087) (0.091)
Conflict × FI −0.014 -0.017
(0.030) (0.030)
Conflict × NFC 0.021 0.025
(0.087) (0.087)
Openness to experience 0.071**
(0.036)
Conscientiousness −0.026
(0.018)
Extraversion −0.034**
(0.014)
Agreeableness 0.017
(0.028)
Neuroticism 0.002
(0.017)
Actively open-minded thinking 0.052
(0.066)
Observations 942 942 942 942
The dummy Conflict takes the value 1 for the respective versions of the questions;
Alignment is the reference category. Standard errors (in parentheses) are (conservatively)
clustered at the level of counterbalance condition (question order).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
medians above 30 seconds. Such long response times suggest
that significant deliberation was involved. The behavioral results
(error rates) indicate that in all three pairs, the constructed
alignment version was easier than the conflict version. Hence
we are confident that the constructed pairs worked as intended.
However, the evidence on response times is mixed. For one of
the pairs, responses to the alignment question were significantly
faster than responses to the conflict version, for another the
relation was the opposite, and for the third no significant
differences were found. Pooling all the data, a panel regression
controlling for swiftness and numeracy indicated a significantly
positive effect of alignment on response times. This provides
evidence of a tendency for longer response times in the
easier decisions, which stands in direct contradiction with both
Hypothesis H1 and the idea that easier decisions are made faster
(Dashiell, 1937; Mosteller and Nogee, 1951).
In Alós-Ferrer and Hügelschäfer (2016), it was already found
that responses to different conflict questions used to measure
base-rate neglect were affected differently by personality factors.
From a conservative point of view, the only conclusion that
can be drawn at this point is that, in spite of their apparent
similarities at the abstract level, the heavily-framed, context-rich
questions might activate quite different processes and process
combinations. To fully understand base-rate neglect, and in
particular its roots in different decision processes, future research
should concentrate on separating framing effects and process
conflict or alignment, moving away from the standard questions
used in the literature.
The regression analysis allows us to examine the effect of
personality differences on both choice data and response times.
Scales as FI, NFC, and AOT had no effect in our sample
when aggregating across questions. Higher scores in the classic
CRT had no effect on error likelihood for the conflict versions
of the questions, and surprisingly even increased errors for
the alignment versions. In contrast, higher scores in the two
items of the extended CRT reduced errors both for conflict
and alignment questions. Regarding the Big Five Inventory,
Extraversion resulted in longer response times and more errors,
and Openness to Experience significantly reduced errors and
increased response times.
5.2. Conjunction Fallacy
5.2.1. Question Analysis (Conjunction Fallacy)
The following four questions refer to the conjunction fallacy. To
examine this bias, we employed problems analogous to the classic
LINDA question from Tversky and Kahneman (1983).
(CFC) Tom is 34 years old. He is intelligent, punctual but
unimaginative, and somewhat lifeless. In school, he was
strong in mathematics but weak in social studies and
humanities. Which of the following statements is more
likely to be true?
◦ Tom plays in a rock band for a hobby.
◦ Tom plays in a rock band for a hobby and is an
accountant.
(CFA) Klaus is 41 years old, single, introverted, and very
intelligent. He majored in physics. As a student, he
played pen-and-paper role-playing games, and also
participated in several chess tournaments.Which of the
following statements is more likely to be true?
◦ Klaus DJs on the weekend.
◦ Klaus DJs on the weekend or is a university
professor.
(CFN1) Claire is 30 years old, single, open-minded, and very
smart. As a student of literature, she was deeply
concerned with issues of discrimination and social
justice, and also participated in several demonstrations.
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Which of the following statements is more likely to be
true?
◦ Claire is active in the animal-rights movement.
◦Claire is active in the animal-rights movement and
works in an international company.
(CFN2) Richard is 31 years old, married with no children. A
man of high ability and high motivation, he promises
to be successful in his field. He is well liked by his
colleagues. Which of the following statements is more
likely to be true?
◦ Richard is an engineer.
◦ Richard is an engineer and is active in the civil-
rights movement.
The (CFC) item, which is adapted from Tversky and Kahneman
(1983) (see also De Neys and Bonnefon, 2013), is analogous to
the LINDA problem. Intuition prescribes to select the second
option, because the frame seems in line with the stereotype of an
accountant more than with that of a rock-band member. This is
obviously incorrect, because the simultaneous realization of two
disjoint events cannot be more probable than one of the events.
(CFA), (CFN1), and (CFN2) represent different non-conflict
versions of the same problem. First, by substituting “and”
with “or” in (CFA), the stereotypical answer suggested by the
frame becomes logically valid. The change does not affect the
mechanism used to correctly answer to the problem, which is
still the same as in (CFC). Therefore (CFA) is an alignment
counterpart of the conflict item (CFC). Second, the frame of
(CFN1) is adapted from the original LINDA problem (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1983). By presenting the cue linked to the
stereotype (“animal-rights movement”) in both answers, the
heuristic which misleads participants in (CFC) cannot directly
be applied because it does not have a favored option. Therefore
(CFN1) is a neutral counterpart of the conflict item (CFC). Third,
(CFN2) is adapted from Kahneman and Tversky (1973). The
description of Richard is neutral with respect to the two suggested
answers; hence the heuristic process activated in (CFC) is no
longer available. Therefore (CFN2) represents another possible
neutral counterpart of (CFC).
Figure 3 depicts the percentages of errors and correct
responses (panel A) and the response times (panel B). We
compared the response times in the conflict question to those of
the non-conflict variants, but we found no significant differences
whatsoever, neither for the alignment question (CFA) (median
24.02 s, mean 25.33 s, SD = 7.79, compared to median 23.34 s,
mean 24.63 s, SD = 9.90 for (CFC); WSR test, N = 143,
z = −1.58, p = 0.113) nor for the neutral questions (CFN1)
(median 23.61 s, mean 25.32 s, SD = 9.32, compared to median
23.24 s, mean 24.67 s, SD = 9.99 for (CFC); WSR test, N =
144, z = −0.64, p = 0.524) and (CFN2) (median 22.64 s, mean
23.52 s, SD = 8.67 for (CFN2), compared to median 23.14 s,
mean 24.58 s, SD = 9.93 for (CFC);WSR test,N = 145, z = 0.78,
p = 0.437).
We also compared the percentages of errors in the non-
conflict questions to those of the conflict question. The
proportion of errors in the conflict question was significantly
larger than in the alignment question (CFA) [9.09% (13)
compared to 42.66% (61) for (CFC); McNemar’s test: N = 143,
χ2
(1)
= 32.91, p < 0.001] and in the neutral questions (CFN1)
[27.78% (40), compared to 41.67% (60) for (CFC); McNemar’s
test: N = 144, χ2
(1)
= 7.41, p = 0.007] and (CFN2) [13.79% (20),
compared to 42.07% (61) for (CFC); McNemar’s test: N = 145,
χ2
(1)
= 32.96, p < 0.001].
As can be seen from Table 5, the likelihood of a correct
answer to the standard conjunction-fallacy problem (CFC)
was significantly increased with increasing CRT score when
considering the classic 3-item version, but not when considering
only the two additional items from Toplak et al. (2014). This
result is in line with the findings of Oechssler et al. (2009) and
Alós-Ferrer and Hügelschäfer (2016), and also with Liberali et al.
(2012), who found a negative correlation between CRT score and
number of conjunction fallacies. In contrast, there were no effects
of FI and NFC.
5.2.2. Regression Analysis (Conjunction Fallacy)
Our data forms a perfectly balanced panel with 4 decisions
per participant. Table 8 reports random-effects panel regressions
on response times, transformed logarithmically. The alignment
dummy is significantly positive in all three models. The effect
of swiftness is as in previous sections. A high score in Need
for Cognition is negatively related to response time. Further,
the error dummy is significant and positive, meaning that
participants making an error in the conflict and neutral versions
of the question need more time than participants giving a correct
answer. Again, this is a strictly between-subjects comparison
which might simply reflect cognitive-capacity correlates.
To analyze actual choices, we ran random-effects probit panel
regressions on correct answers (Table 9). In the basic model,
the dummies conflict and neutral are significant and negative,
indicating a lower probability of being answered correctly
compared to the alignment counterpart. Scoring high in the
numeracy scale is associated with an increased probability of
giving a correct answer to the questions. Higher scores in
the classic CRT are a significant positive predictor for correct
answers, in particular for the conflict item (Model 3). This is in
agreement with Liberali et al. (2012), who reported a significant
negative association between CRT score and committing the
conjunction fallacy. In contrast, the number of correct answers
to the two items of CRT2 is not predictive (Model 3; post-hoc
test of the linear combination of CRT2 plus Conflict × CRT2:
coefficient −0.136, SD = 0.130, z = −1.04, p = 0.297). Results
remain stable when controlling for interindividual heterogeneity
by including personality traits (Model 4).
5.2.3. Discussion (Conjunction Fallacy)
Median response times for conjunction-fallacy questions were in
the 22–26 s range. Error rates show that the non-conflict versions
of the basic (conflict) conjunction-fallacy question were easier.
Hence we are confident that the question manipulation worked
as intended. However, there were no significant differences in
response times. Taking advantage of the panel structure of the
data, and controlling for individual differences, the regression
revealed a significant positive effect of the alignment question
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Error rates (in %) and (B) mean response times (in seconds) for conjunction-fallacy questions. Reported significance refers to McNemar’s tests for
error rates and to Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests for response times, as reported in the text. ***p < 0.01.
on response times (contrary to Hypothesis H1), but no effect of
neutral questions.
One possible explanation for these disappointing results
is related to the structure of the questions in detail. By
their very nature, these questions seek to consider stereotypes.
One alternative presents an event E, the other alternative the
conjunction of events E and F (or, in the case of (CFA),
their disjunction). In the conflict question (CFC), the frame
is stereotypically consistent with F, hence “E and F” becomes
an incorrect, intuitive response. In (CFN1) and (CFN2), the
intention was to have an event F unrelated to the frame, hence
shutting down stereotypical thinking. In (CFA), the frame is
stereotypically consistent with F, but the introduction of a
disjunction makes the answer “E or F” correct.
The process logic operates under the assumption that a
stereotype-based, intuitive process will select one answer or the
other on the basis of the match between frame and events, and a
more deliberative process will operate on the basis of the logic
of probability. That the latter is indeed active is evidenced by
the sharp drop in the error rate from (CFC) to (CFA), where
the disjunction is introduced. However, the characteristics of
the stereotypical process might not be fully understood. For
instance, in all four questions, there is a basic stereotypical
inconsistency between events E and F. This might activate
stereotypical thinking even in the neutral questions (CFN1) and
(CFN2), and create a conflict in the alignment question (CFA). In
other words, the basic structure of conjunction-fallacy questions
might make it difficult to disentangle stereotypical thinking
and deliberative processes. Further research should hence try to
isolate the actual process involved in stereotypical thinking for
this kind of questions.
Personality factors had no effect on response times for
conjunction-fallacy questions, with the exception of Need for
Cognition, for which higher scores resulted in faster responses.
Regarding actual responses, higher scores in the CRT reduced
errors (particularly under conflict) as did higher numeracy
scores, but FI, NFC, and AOT had no effect. From the Big
Five Inventory, only Conscientiousness and Neuroticism had
a significant (positive) effect on correct answers, reducing
errors.
5.3. Ratio Bias
The last problem refers to the ratio bias (Kirkpatrick and Epstein,
1992; Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994), which is the tendency to
judge a low-probability event as more likely when it is presented
as a ratio of large numbers (e.g., 10 in 100) than as a smaller-
numbered ratio (e.g., 1 in 10). For instance, in a study by Denes-
Raj and Epstein (1994), a majority of participants preferred an
8-in-100 chance of winning to a 1-in-10 chance of winning.
5.3.1. Question Analysis (Ratio Bias, Conflict vs.
Neutral)
We selected one of the scenarios used by Denes-Raj and Epstein
(1994) and complemented it with a non-conflict version as
follows.
(RBC) There are two urns, a large one containing 100 balls, and
a small one containing 10 balls. You must choose one of
the urns. A single ball will be extracted at random from
the urn you choose, and if the ball is black, you will win.
If it is white, you will lose. The small urn contains 1 black
ball and 9 white balls. The large urn contains 8 black
balls and 92 white balls. Which urn should you choose
to maximize the probability of winning?
◦ The large urn.
◦ The small urn.
(RBN) There are two urns, a large one containing 100 balls, and
a small one containing 90 balls. You must choose one of
the urns. A single ball will be extracted at random from
the urn you choose, and if the ball is black, you will win.
If it is white, you will lose. The small urn contains 8 black
balls and 82 white balls. The large urn contains 8 black
balls and 92 white balls. Which urn should you choose
to maximize the probability of winning?
◦ The large urn.
◦ The small urn.
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Error rates (in %) and (B) mean response times (in seconds) for ratio-bias questions. Reported significance refers to McNemar’s tests for error rates
and to Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests for response times. ***p < 0.01.
For the (RBC) item, the intuitive but incorrect answer is to select
the first option. In (RBN), the number of winning balls in the
small urn is changed to make both urns contain the same number
of winning balls. The heuristic which led participants in (RBC) to
choose the urn with the biggest number of winning balls cannot
be applied anymore, but comparing proportions is still possible.
Therefore (RBN) is a neutral counterpart of the conflict item
(RBC).
Figure 4 depicts the percentages of errors and correct
responses (panel A) and the response times (panel B). Answers to
the conflict question were significantly slower than the answers
to the neutral question (median response time 42.10 s, mean
46.93 s, SD = 17.73 in case of conflict; median 35.40 s, mean
36.89 s, SD = 12.89 in case of neutral; WSR test, N = 149, z =
5.36, p < 0.001). This is inconsistent with Hypothesis H2 (and
also opposite to the results for CRT questions (Q2C) and (Q2N),
which did conform to H2).
Regarding error rates, for (RBC) there were 9.40% (14) errors,
and 90.60% (135) correct answers. For (RBN) there was only 1
error (0.67%), and all other 148 answers (99.33%) were correct.
Of course, the proportion of errors in the conflict question was
significantly larger than in the alignment question [McNemar’s
test, N = 149, χ2
(1)
= 11.27, p = 0.001].
As can be seen from Table 5, a higher score in the classic 3-
item CRT led to a significantly higher likelihood of answering the
(RBC) item correctly. In contrast, none of the scores in CRT2, FI,
or NFC affected the likelihood of correct answers. In particular,
we fail to reproduce the result of Pacini and Epstein (1999),
who reported a more pronounced ratio bias for participants
low in NFC.
5.3.2. Discussion (Ratio Bias)
Error rates were quite low even for the conflict question, but
response times were relatively long (medians in the 35–40 s
range). The difference in error rates shows that the neutral
question worked as intended, with the conflict being removed
by shutting down the intuitive process. However, response
times were longer for the conflict question, in contradiction
with Hypothesis H2. In contrast, the result is compatible with
the view that the conflict question induces a struggle between
different tendencies which makes the decision more difficult and
results in longer deliberation times, analogously to the “closeness
to indifference” argument inspired by Dashiell (1937) and
Mosteller and Nogee (1951). The dual-process logic under which
Hypothesis H2 was derived (which views conflict resolution
as a relatively short part of the decision process) might be
more appropriate for shorter decisions as those studied for CRT
questions, but the “closeness to indifference” view of tradeoffs and
conflicts might be more appropriate for long decisions as those
related to our ratio-bias questions. This points out to a need for
more detailed models of decision processes, especially if they are
to encompass relatively long decisions.
6. GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our work provides novel evidence on response times and the
multiplicity of decision processes for a category of questions
which are extensively used in the decision-making literature.
Since responses in experiments in this domain are relatively slow
(medians around half a minute or above), our research had an
exploratory character.
We selected two kinds of items, those arising from the
Cognitive Reflection Test and extensions thereof, and those used
to measure decision biases for probability judgments. All such
questions create a conflict between an intuitive process and more
deliberative thinking, in the terms of dual-process theories. Our
strategy of research was to create a non-conflict version for each
item, by either making the intuitive impulse correct (resulting
in an alignment question), shutting it down (creating a neutral
question), or making it dominant (creating a heuristic question).
For CRT items, results were encouraging. The differences
in response times are as predicted by dual-process theories,
with alignment and heuristic variants leading to faster responses
and neutral questions to slower responses than the original,
conflict questions. That is, even though response times are
relatively long (well above those found in typical experimental
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TABLE 8 | Random-effects regressions on log response times of
conjunction-fallacy questions.
Log(response time) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Neutral −0.056 −0.056 −0.007
(0.125) (0.126) (0.128)
Alignment 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.143***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.045)
Number of letters 0.005** 0.005** 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Swiftness 0.190*** 0.183***
(0.069) (0.070)
Numeracy −0.002 0.004
(0.022) (0.023)
Male −0.012 −0.010
(0.041) (0.041)
Faith in intuition 0.005 0.008
(0.028) (0.026)
Need for cognition −0.029** −0.028**
(0.012) (0.011)
Openness to experience −0.009 −0.010
(0.031) (0.030)
Conscientiousness 0.006 0.007
(0.014) (0.014)
Extraversion 0.003 0.003
(0.011) (0.011)
Agreeableness 0.013 0.013
(0.026) (0.027)
Neuroticism −0.006 −0.003
(0.012) (0.012)
Actively open-minded thinking −0.005 0.000
(0.024) (0.024)
Error 0.156***
(0.048)
Error × alignment −0.104
(0.132)
Observations 632 632 632
The dummies Neutral and Alignment take the value 1 for the respective versions of
the questions; Conflict is the reference category. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
(conservatively) clustered at the level of counterbalance condition (question order).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
workhorses for dual-process theories), evidence is consistent
with the involvement of different decision processes and the
diagnosticity of their interaction (conflict or not).
For decision-bias items, results were sobering. Results on
conflict vs. alignment for base-rate neglect questions were
inconclusive on the aggregate in spite of significant effects for
some individual items. In our opinion, this points out that
the heavily-framed questions employed in this area are not
stylized enough to properly identify the involved processes, and
further efforts are needed in order to disentangle framing and
the effects of conflict or alignment among decision processes.
For the conjunction fallacy, response-time differences were
generally not significant, even though the manipulations worked
as intended in terms of error rates. In view of the structure of
the items, we tentatively conclude that stereotypical thinking
cannot be properly isolated with the standard frames used to
study the conjunction fallacy, and recommend further research
to move away from this basic structure. For the ratio-bias
item, where response times are particularly long, we obtained
a clear result showing that a neutral version of the original,
conflict question results in lower error rates and shorter response
times. This is compatible with the view that, in this case,
process conflict reflects a stronger behavioral struggle resulting in
longer deliberation (following a classic “closeness to indifference”
argument).
6.1. Response Times and Underlying
Assumptions
It is worth discussing possible explanations for the differences in
results between the CRT items and the items on decision biases.
Two avenues are apparent, one procedural and one conceptual.
The procedural avenue concerns the fact that our
implementation of the decision-bias items involved binary
choices, while the CRT items were open-ended [with the
exception of (Q4C) and (Q4A)]. The reason is that, for the
CRT items, the exactly correct answer is still reasonably easy
to arrive at, and the alternative, intuitive process provides a
specific answer. Hence the open-answer format is natural. In
contrast, for the base-rate questions the postulated processes do
not deliver precise answers. Correct answers are the result of
complex, precise calculations while “intuitive” tendencies have
a directional nature (high or low probability estimate). Hence,
we presented those items with binary-choice answers (larger or
smaller than 50%). However, it is unlikely that this procedural
difference is determinant for the difference in results. First, we
did not compare response times of different answers for a fixed
question, but rather the response times for different questions.
Whatever answers the different processes led to, differences
among types of questions should subsist. Second, for the items
related to the conjunction fallacy and the ratio bias, the binary-
choice format is indeed natural, because the correct response
is easy to arrive at, and the alternative intuitive processes do
provide a clear response. However, it remains at least conceivable
that for the base-rate-bias item pairs, the presentation of binary-
choice answers lowered participant involvement (since there
was no need to arrive at an exact numerical estimate), hence
activating decision processes different from those postulated
in the analysis. This, however, would have no bearing on the
conjunction-fallacy and ratio-bias items.
The conceptual avenue arises from our discussion in Section
2.4. Our hypotheses are always derived from the confluence
of two effects. First, the time required for conflict detection
and resolution should be smaller if there is no actual conflict.
Second, the kind of question should affect the percentage of
intuitive (hence faster) decisions. Evidence on conflict detection
and resolution, however, indicates that the required time
might be relatively short. Specifically, EEG research shows
that conflict detection and resolution are probably associated
with activity in the anterior cingulate cortex occurring as
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TABLE 9 | Random-effects probit regressions on correct answers to
conjunction-fallacy questions.
Correct answer Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Male 0.062 −0.092 −0.088 0.003
(0.151) (0.116) (0.117) (0.110)
Conflict −1.173*** −1.175*** −1.072 −1.128
(0.226) (0.226) (0.788) (0.775)
Neutral −0.491*** −0.492*** −0.489*** −0.499***
(0.119) (0.123) (0.122) (0.117)
Classic CRT 0.169*** 0.089** 0.111*
(0.047) (0.037) (0.059)
CRT2 −0.063 −0.030 −0.013
(0.058) (0.030) (0.055)
Faith in intuition 0.070 0.076 0.085
(0.066) (0.064) (0.074)
Need for cognition −0.005 0.012 0.017
(0.041) (0.028) (0.048)
Numeracy 0.081* 0.084* 0.074**
(0.048) (0.048) (0.036)
Conflict × classic CRT 0.250*** 0.248***
(0.095) (0.091)
Conflict × CRT2 −0.106 −0.098
(0.110) (0.112)
Conflict × FI −0.014 −0.011
(0.116) (0.108)
Conflict × NFC −0.059 −0.057
(0.104) (0.105)
Openness to experience −0.012
(0.049)
Conscientiousness 0.020***
(0.006)
Extraversion −0.001
(0.026)
Agreeableness −0.017
(0.055)
Neuroticism 0.092***
(0.032)
Actively open-minded thinking 0.094
(0.068)
Observations 632 632 632 632
The dummies Conflict and Neutral take the value 1 for the respective versions of the
questions; Alignment is the reference category. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
(conservatively) clustered at the level of counterbalance condition (question order).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
early as 200 milliseconds (see, e.g., Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003;
Coderre et al., 2011; Achtziger et al., 2014). Although this
evidence has been gathered for paradigms with simple stimuli
(suitable for EEG analysis), it can be speculated that even for
paradigms with longer response times as the ones considered
here, the time necessary for conflict detection and resolution
in the sense of dual-process theories is relatively short (if at
all relevant), implying that response-time effects should be
driven by the second phenomenon described above, namely
the shift in likelihood from one type of process to the
other.
If, for the sake of the argument, we accept this preliminary
hypothesis, we can reexamine our results. Evidence from our
CRT item pairs is compatible with the postulate that, relative to
conflict items, the balance is shifted toward automatic processes
in case of alignment, and obviously toward deliberative processes
for neutral items. Since the former are faster than the latter, this
observation suffices to explain our data. It is also compatible with
the fact that smaller error rates are observed in both cases, since
in case of alignment intuitive processes also deliver the correct
answer.
For our decision-bias items, as shown in the analysis sections
above, it remains true that error rates for alignment and neutral
items are lower than for the corresponding conflict items (the
comparison was significant in every single case). Hence, based on
the error-rate evidence, we have no reason to doubt that in every
item pair, the process shift occurred as postulated. However,
response-time evidence appears inconsistent. At this point of
the argument, the original response-time predictions rest on a
single assumption, namely that the expected response times of
the deliberative processes for these items are indeed always larger
than the expected response times of the corresponding intuitive
processes (TU > TH). Given the simple nature of the processes
involved in the CRT questions, there is little reason to question
this assumption in that setting. For decision-bias items, however,
it has been argued that many of the involved heuristics might
not be fast shortcuts, but rather “cognitive heuristics” including
multi-step operations (even if they are sometimes called “fast
and frugal,” Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996). If this is the case
for the intuitive processes involved in decision biases of the type
examined here, then the assumption of a significant difference
in expected response times among processes for this particular
case might not be justified. Our data is consistent with this
interpretation, but further evidence is needed.
6.2. Long Response Times and Types of
Decisions
At this point, we can conclude that the scope of response
times has a definite influence on their interpretation. For short
response times it is comparatively easier to identify the involved
decision processes and simple dual-process models deliver
instructive predictions. For longer decisions, the exact length
thereof might reflect moderators of deliberation, and predictions
should be more modest at this point. Clearly, there is a need
for improved models of deliberation and the associated process
data.
It should be kept in mind that we have concentrated on
decisions from inference where an objectively correct decision
can be identified in advance and natural hypotheses on the
nature of the involved processes are available. This is in stark
contrast to preferential-choice settings, where the nature of
the involved processes is open to discussion. For instance,
Cappelen et al. (2015) examined response times in the dictator
game and argued that choosing a fair allocation of resources
among two people (as opposed to keeping most of a given
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resource for oneself) might bemore intuitive, because the average
response times were shorter (but still quite long). As observed by
Myrseth and Wollbrant (2016), this might amount to a reverse-
inference fallacy, especially since the conclusion is not based on a
theoretical model, but rather operates as if there was a one-to-one
correspondence between processes and choices (see Alós-Ferrer,
2016 for a discussion of this point). Further, preferential choice
presents an added difficulty. We have concentrated our analysis
on response-time differences across questions, which enable
paired comparisons of data. This is important because there
exists a large response-time heterogeneity across individuals,
which becomes exacerbated for long response times as the ones
we study. In studies of preferential choice as Cappelen et al.
(2015), there is exactly one observation per individual, and the
population of subjects is partitioned according to the response.
Hence, individual heterogeneity is harder to control for. This is
why our analysis focused on paired-observations tests, moving
to regressions only to clarify the possible effect of additional
individual correlates.
6.3. Personality Measures
Our analysis also points out the necessity of further research on
the influence of personality traits on decision-making biases. In
spite of some clear general trends, evidence is still mixed. We
found that higher scores in the CRT resulted in significantly
more correct responses for both the conjunction fallacy and the
ratio bias. However, we did not find a clear predictive effect of
higher scores in the CRT on correct responses for base-rate-
neglect questions. Faith in Intuition, Need for Cognition, and
Actively Open-Minded Thinking were generally non-predictive
for correct responses in our sample. However, we used the short
REI-10 version with 5 items per subscale, while Alós-Ferrer and
Hügelschäfer (2016) used a 15-item version.
Regarding the Big Five Inventory, we confirmed the typical
correlations with other personality traits found in the literature.
We included them as controls in regressions on both choices
and response times for the base-rate-neglect and conjunction-
fallacy items. We found significant effects, but none of the
five personality traits showed a consistent effect for base-rate
neglect and the conjunction fallacy. For instance, Extraversion
resulted in more base-rate-neglect errors but had no effect on the
conjunction-fallacy items. This is especially interesting, because
this personality trait has been related to amore sensitivemidbrain
dopaminergic reward system, leading to difficulties in regulating
impulsiveness (Depue and Collins, 1999; Cohen et al., 2005).
We conclude that the effects of personality measures often
appear to be bias-specific, and apparently related constructs,
which are supposed to measure related traits, often have different
effects. The CRT is predictive for different decision biases, but the
scale is becoming generally known and, contrary to self-report
questionnaires, cannot be reliablymeasured repeatedly. Subscales
from the Rational-Experiential Inventory have a predictive value
(recall Alós-Ferrer and Hügelschäfer, 2012, 2016), but the effects
appear to be small in general. Personality traits from the Big Five
Inventory often have significant effects, but those are generally
inconsistent across biases. Larger datasets, allowing for the study
of multiple interactions, might contribute to obtain a more clear
picture.
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